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Review of George SANTAYANA, Three
Philosophical Poets – Lucretius, Dante,
and Goethe




George SANTAYANA, Three Philosophical Poets – Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe, edited by Kellie
Dawson & David E. Spiech, Cambridge, Ma., The MIT Press, 2019, p. xxxvi + 239
1 Three Philosophical Poets is published as volume VIII of the Critical Edition of The Works of
George  Santayana,  with  the  same  impeccable  editorial  apparatus  as  the  preceding
volumes and an excellent introduction by James Seaton. This introduction is geared to
shedding  light  on  the  broader  philosophical  context  of  a  book  that  Seaton  rightly
considers “as perhaps the best introduction to Santayana’s work” (Seaton 2019:  xi).
Indeed,  it  is  a  relatively short  book that  touches upon some of  Santayana’s  central
topics, such as the relationship of philosophy to poetry, of science-inspired naturalism
to religious “supernaturalism,” of facts to values and of common sense to “heretic”
transcendentalism, while providing, in masterful prose, critical insights on Lucretius,
Dante and Goethe that, in A.O. Lovejoy’s words, “no specialist [in those authors] can
afford to leave unread” (Lovejoy 1911: 245).
2 The  material  for  the  book  stems  from  a  course  offered  by  Harvard’s  Philosophy
Department that Santayana described as “a half-course in which the conception of the
world  and  the  moral  sentiment  of  the  three  [writers]  should  be  described  and
compared” (Santayana 2011: 360). The course became a series of lectures delivered at
Columbia  University  and  the  University  of  Wisconsin  in  1910,  also  the  year  of
publication  of  the  book  by  Harvard  University  Press.  The  volume  inaugurated  the
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Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature series, which continues to publish learned
works to this day. In his Preface Santayana acknowledges, with characteristic (false?)
modesty, that his book is not quite as erudite as the name of the series would lead one
to expect:
Though produced under such learned auspices, my book can make no great claims
to  learning.  It  contains  the  impressions  of  an  amateur,  the  appreciations  of  an
ordinary  reader,  concerning  three  great  writers,  two  of  whom  at  least  might
furnish matter enough for the studies of a lifetime […]. I am no specialist in the
study of Lucretius; I am not a Dante scholar nor a Goethe scholar. I can report no
facts and propose no hypotheses about these men which are not at hand in their
familiar works, or in well-known commentaries upon them. My excuse for writing
about them, notwithstanding, is merely the human excuse which every new poet
has for writing about the spring. They have attracted me; they have moved me to
reflection; they have revealed to me certain aspects of nature and of philosophy
which I am prompted by mere sincerity to express, if anybody seems interested or
willing to listen. What I can offer the benevolent reader, therefore, is no learned
investigation.  It  is  only a  piece of  literary criticism, together with a first  broad
lesson in the history of philosophy – and, perhaps, in philosophy itself. (TPP: xxxiii) 
3 Although Santayana claims that “taken together [Lucretius, Dante and Goethe] sum up
all European philosophy” (a debatable assertion), this supposed historical completeness
is not the key to understanding Santayana’s choice of poets, which has more to do with
the fact that they correspond to facets or “moments” of his own matured philosophy.
Lucretius corresponds to the materialistic or naturalistic component, of which he is
“the unrivalled poet”: he “sees the world to be one great edifice, one great machine, all
its parts reacting upon one another, and growing into one another” (TPP: 4); he, better
than any other poet,  faces nature in its immensity and its alienness to all  egotistic
human desires; that is, in its truth. On the moral plane, this vision is completed by an
allegiance to Epicurus’s values: “Allowed to look once upon the wonderful spectacle […]
we should look and admire, for to-morrow we die; we should eat, drink, and be merry,
but moderately and with much art,  lest we die miserably, and die to-day.” (TPP:  4).
However, “Lucretius’ notion […] of what is positively worthwhile or attainable is very
meagre: freedom from superstition, with so much natural science as may secure that
freedom, friendship,  and  a  few  cheap  and  healthful  animal  pleasures.  No  love,  no
patriotism, no enterprise, no religion.” (TPP: 122).
4 Dante’s  case  is  the  exact  obverse:  his  conception  of  reality,  all  “beautiful  stories,
wonderful  theories,  and  comforting  rites”  (TPP: 4-5),  is  constructed  out  of  the
projection of ideal values onto the realm of facts and is therefore fundamentally false:
“it is a view of nature intercepted by myths and worked out by dialectic. […] It is a
mirage.”  (TPP:  123).  Yet  he  has  a  much  clearer  knowledge  than  Lucretius  of  the
complexities  of  the  human  heart:  “he  sees  the  various  pitfalls  of  life  with  intense
distinctness; and seeing them clearly, and how fatal each is, he sees also why men fall
into them, the dream that leads men astray, and the sweetness of those goods that are
impossible.” In other words, Dante, however false his physics, is a great master: “the
master of those who know by experience what is worth knowing by experience.” (TPP :
122).
5 While it is not difficult to understand how Lucretius and Dante complement each other
(“if we rise from Lucretius to Dante, there is much left behind which we cannot afford
to  lose”)  (TPP:  123),  Goethe’s  role  in  the  triad  is  not  as  straightforward.  Bertrand
Russell,  for one, after reminiscing that “many years ago [he] derived great pleasure
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from Three Philosophical Poets” (Russell 1940: 474), hedges his assessment by adding: “at
any  rate  from  the  discussion  of  the  two  who  were  Italians.”  What  is  it  that  mars
Russell’s pleasure in regard to Santayana’s treatment of Goethe? It’s the thought that
were it not for “authority,” Santayana wouldn’t “force himself” to express so much
respect for the author of Faust (Russell 1940: 474). Thus, for Russell, the inclusion of
Goethe in  Santayana’s  canon  of  great  philosophical  poets  results  from…  literary
conformism.  In  his  reply,  Santayana  concedes  that “[he]  feel[s]  no  such affinity  to
Goethe as [he] feel[s] to Lucretius and Dante.” Yet, “[his] effort to overcome this private
bias was not due to deference to current opinion” (Santayana 1940: 582) but, as we will
presently see, to his perception of the profound significance of the cultural movements
embodied in Faust.
6 Lovejoy, also, is convinced that Santayana’s ranking of Goethe is the lowest of the three
poets. He contends that “[his] lecture on Goethe is […] an incident in the assault upon
romanticism  now  going  briskly  forward  in  many  quarters”  (Lovejoy  1911:  246).
According to Lovejoy, Santayana missed the dominant, yet latent, idea in Faust, an idea
that is more difficult to retrieve from this work than Lucretius’ or Dante’s teachings are
from their  more directly  didactical  poems.  What is  this  central  idea “to which Mr.
Santayana  seemingly  remains  irreconcilable”  (Lovejoy  1911:  246)?  It  consists,  says
Lovejoy, “of an apotheosis of the notion of becoming, of a conviction that the ultimate
values of existence lie not in the goal but in the process and in the inner experiences
which accompany it” (Lovejoy 1911: 246). Now, if Lovejoy is probably right about the
Heraclitean and romantic  doctrine implicit  in Goethe’s  Faust,  he is  almost  certainly
wrong in arguing that Santayana failed to appreciate the importance of that central
idea. On the contrary, Santayana states emphatically that “Goethe gives us what is most
fundamental – the turbid flux of sense, the cry of the heart, the first tentative notions
of art and science” (Lovejoy 1911: 246); in other words, Goethe gives us “human life in
its  immediacy.”  He  also  gives  the  “transfiguration  of  the  immediate”  that  Lovejoy
suspects Santayana of having missed:
What  ought  to  be  imperfect  in  time  is,  because  of  its  very  imperfection  there,
perfect when viewed under the form of eternity. To live, to live just as we do, that –
if we could only realize it – is the purpose and the crown of living. We must seek
improvement; we must be dissatisfied with ourselves; that is the appointed attitude,
the  histrionic  pose,  that  is  to  keep  the  ball  rolling.  But  while  we  feel  this
dissatisfaction  we are  perfectly  satisfactory,  and  while  we  play  our  game  and
constantly lose it, we are winning the game for God. (TPP: 113)
7 Such is the moral that Santayana discerns in Faust. It  is  derived from the romantic
attitude in poetry and the transcendental method in philosophy. This attitude and this
method, contrary to what Lovejoy apparently believes, has “great merit” in Santayana’s
eyes: they are “purgative and liberating,” “they put us back at the beginning of our
experience,” “they disintegrate convention” and “restore us to ourselves” (TPP: 115), all
of which can hardly be deemed menial philosophical accomplishments, even though,
naturally,  romanticism  and  transcendentalism  have  well-known  limitations,  just  as
Lucretius’ naturalism and Dante’s supernaturalism do.
8 Santayana concludes the book with an almost messianic invocation of a future poet
who would merge and update the philosophical-poetical virtues of Goethe (the poet of
immediacy), Lucretius (the poet of nature) and Dante (the poet of salvation). Although
this  supreme philosophical  poet is  “still  in limbo,” the hypothetical  poem he could
write would be yet another instance of the rational poetry that Santayana extols in TPP.
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This (obviously untimely) preference for rational poetry, as Seaton reminds us in his
introduction, was targeted by proponents of the “New Criticism,” as exemplifying the
limitations  of  a  literary  approach “that  is  less  interested  in  literature  than in  ‘the
separable content of literature’” (Seaton 2019: xv). But Santayana anticipated to a great
extent this sort of objection, by arguing that “scope” and “depth” are not inimical to
poetry, as long as the form of poetry is not simply thrown over the substance of prose:
If a short passage is poetical because it is pregnant with suggestion of a few things
[…] how much more poetical ought a vision to be which was pregnant with all we
care for? Focus a little experience, give some scope and depth to your feeling, and it
grows imaginative; give it more scope and more depth, focus all experience within
it, make it a philosopher’s vision of the world, and it will grow imaginative in a
superlative  degree,  and  be  supremely  poetical.  The  difficulty,  after  having  the
experience  to  symbolize,  lies  only  in  having  enough  imagination  to  hold  and
suspend it in a thought; and further to give this thought such verbal expression
that  others may be able  to decipher it,  and to be stirred by it  as  by a  wind of
suggestion sweeping the whole forest of their memories. (TPP: 9)
9 This, of course, presupposes the conceptual separability of thought and imagination
from  their  verbal  expressions.  But  that  is  as  it  should  be:  Santayana’s  naturalistic
approach to thought and language entails a sound resistance to the inference that is
supposed to take one from the uncontested fact that language mediates our cognitive
contact with the world to the questionable conclusion that the only way to gain access
to reality is through its articulation in speech.
10 One way of approaching the idea of “rational poetry” is by contrast to what Santayana
called, ten years before TPP, in an eponymous essay, “the poetry of barbarism”:
We find our contemporary poets incapable of any high wisdom, incapable of any
imaginative rendering of human life and its meaning. Our poets are things of shreds
and patches; they give us episodes and studies, a sketch of this curiosity, a glimpse
of  that  romance;  they  have  no  total  vision,  no  grasp  of  the  whole  reality,  and
consequently  no capacity  for  a  sane and steady idealization.  The comparatively
barbarous ages had a poetry of the ideal; they had visions of beauty, order, and
perfection. This age of material elaboration has no sense for those things. Its fancy
is retrospective, whimsical, and flickering; its ideals, when it has any, are negative
and partial; its moral strength is a blind and miscellaneous vehemence. Its poetry,
in a word, is the poetry of barbarism. (Santayana 1989: 104)
11 Whitman is the paramount example of a poet that Santayana considers “barbaric,” an
epithet  that  misleadingly  suggest  wholesale  rejection;  for  Santayana’s  criticism  is
mitigated by a perceptive assessment of Whitman’s value as a poet:
Full of sympathy and receptivity, with a wonderful gift of graphic characterization
and an occasional rare grandeur of diction, [Whitman] fills us with a sense of the
individuality and the universality of what he describes – it is a drop in itself yet a
drop in the ocean. The absence of any principle of selection or of a sustained style
enables him to render aspects of things and of emotion which would have eluded a
trained writer. He is, therefore, interesting even where he is grotesque or perverse.
He has accomplished, by the sacrifice of almost every other good quality, something
never so well done before. He has approached common life without bringing in his
mind any higher standard by which to criticise it; he has seen it, not in contrast
with an ideal, but as the expression of forces more indeterminate and elementary
than itself;  and the vulgar, in this cosmic setting, has appeared to him sublime.
(Santayana 1989: 111)
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12 Yet, whatever charm and value Santayana detects in Whitman’s poems, they obviously
don’t amount to the “steady contemplation of all things in their order and worth” (TPP:
7) that defines both “rational poetry” and philosophical vision. 
13 De Natura Rerum, La Divina Commedia and Faust are the works of philosophical – and
highly  civilized  –  poets.  Santayana,  for  his  part,  was,  unashamedly,  a literary
philosopher (and a minor poet, a one-shot novelist, and a wonderful autobiographer).
Still, he had no disdain for science; he understood how painstaking and constrained the
scientific  acquisition  of  truth  is  and that  it  cannot  become the  exclusive model  for
philosophy without stifling its human functions and aspirations.  This new scholarly
edition of TPP provides a very welcome opportunity to confirm anew that the book is
not only a “piece of literary criticism, together with a broad first lesson in the history
of philosophy,” but also a lesson in philosophical wisdom itself, not only in its general
arguments, but in the way it tries to answer particular traditional riddles such as why
Lucretius’ arguments about the fear of death ultimately fail or what makes the lovers
Paolo and Francesca di  Rimini  so wretched in Hell,  even though they are eternally
together, as they so ardently wished.
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